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CHINA 2020: LOOKING FORWARD 
by 
J. A. English-Lueck 
"The present is never our destination, the past and present arc 
only our means, the future alone is our destination." [Quotation 
of Blaise Pascal by Zhao Fusan, vice-chairman of the Chinese 
I
1!1;. Academy of Social Sciences, at the lOth World Federation Conference of the World Futures Federation in Beijing, 1988] (Huang, 1988). 
In November 1988 I began to conduct interviews with various scholars 
in a key university in Southwestern China concerning the future of Chinese 
education, science and modernization. China is a planned society, with 
ideologically defined goals outlining the shape of the future, if only hazily 
and distantly perceived. What do Chinese scholars, a group emerging 
tentatively from the ravages of the Cultural Revolution, think about the 
possibilities facing China? How do those perceptions reveal structural 
features of Chinese society? 
China's role in the consideration of the future is doubly significant. 
First, China represents a fifth of humanity, and her version of the future 
should surely be better understood by Western futurists. Secondly, the field 
of futures studies is heavily dominated by the perspective of the developed 
world, especially the West. Too often, future scenarios are thinly veiled 
exercises in self-projection, middle-class intellectual America writ large. 
Hence my decision to undertake cross-cultural futures research. China can 
also further our understanding of a methodological issue in futurism--the 
role of planning. The benefits and trials of a planned society are hotly 
debated in futures conferences, as a matter of speculation. Yet an 
ethnographic analogy exists today--there are highly planned societies, such 
as China. How does planning shape the perception and reality of alternative 
futures? 
I chose the Ethnographic Futures Research (EFR) technique (Textor, 
1980) as my methodological tool. Through an open-ended interview 
format, the interviewer elicits an individual's concept of the best, worst and 
most probable scenario of a particular future. The individual is encouraged 
to describe freely the future in question, in this case the future of science, 
education and society in China in A.D. 2020. Sometimes I would couch 
this future in personal terms--what will your 4 year old son's life be like in 
the University when he is 34? What will your life be like in the University 
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when you are 60? This approach was used only when needed to elicit 
responses--usually such detailed probing was unnecessary. In addition, each 
interview report contains a brief biographical sketch, intended to give some 
personal context that would help interpret the information. For example, 
if a person had been sent to the Chinese countryside in the 1970s, this 
would illuminate any opinions that person might have on the rural/urban 
split, or for that matter, on the power of the policy-makers who sent him 
there. The interview is primarily an exercise in scenario building--highly 
fruitful for revealing values (what is desired, feared, etc.) as well as those 
issues in the ethnographic present that seem relevant to the interviewee in 
determining the shape of the future, such as economic policy in the 
educational system of China. I had used this technique with great success 
with American holistic healers, midwives, legal personnel and educators. 
However, I had no experience using the technique cross-culturally. 
The Chinese who agreed to be interviewed consisted of scholars from all 
over China studying temporarily in Southwestern China. Although self­
selected, and motivated by the opportunity to practice their English with a 
native speaker, they proved to be a relevant and accessible group. I 
conducted 103 interviews from November 1988 to January 1990. The 
interviews fell into 3 field seasons, November 1988-January 1989, June 
1989, and December 1989 to January 1990. Only a few interviews were 
carried out in June 1989, because I felt that further research would be 
inappropriate and uncomfortable for my potential interviewees in view of 
the turmoil of that time. Thus the bulk of the information comes from the 
winters of 1988/1989 and 1989/1990. All interviewees were asked to give 
some basic background (all names and work units were edited out in 
transcription). Prompting with a fan-like diagram depicting the various 
alternatives (worst to best) stemming from the present, I asked the scholars 
to talk about the future of Chinese science, particularly science education, 
and the impact of science and technology on Chinese society. In practice 
these domains often were generalized to science, education and society. 
METHODOLOGICAL TRIBULATIONS 
The cross-cultural context highlighted some methodological questions I 
had already encountered--such as the issue of analytical reciprocity, how to 
interpret the responses of the interviewees. Moreover, some difficulties 
were generated directly by the problems of doing Chinese futures fieldwork. 
The interviews were quite different in style and content from anything I had 
encountered in their American counterparts. There were some interesting 
limitations in applying the EFR technique in this context, including factors 
such as language, openness, temporal preconceptions and timing. 
In general, any scenario-building technique presents some difficulties for 
analysis. Since the scenarios are a product of spontaneous creativity and 
free association, rarely are they tidily organized in easily understood 
categories--relevant current events, best scenarios, most pessimistic 
scenarios, etc. Instead, as ideas occur to the respondents, they may 
comment on these issues, even if it is inconvenient for the overall 















organization. This problem is often easy to adjust for in the transcription 
phase. However, it implies a methodological question that is not so easily 
resolved, for social scientists must analyze not only what is said, but what 
is left unsaid. As I outlined and tabulated observations on the best and worst 
scenarios I pondered once again the nature of the scenarios I was building. 
If a person mentions a feature of the optimistic scenario, will its opposite 
automatically be implied in the pessimistic scenario? Can we assume a 
reciprocity of worldview--P is favored, Q is the opposite of P, so Q must 
be negatively valued? Are our projected realities really that consistent? 
After all, few other aspects of human behavior are consistent! If someone 
states that population control will determine the success of China's 
economy, it is fairly clear what he means. I can easily determine this 
factor in his optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. However, if someone 
says that the increase in privacy will break down the network of relations 
that maintains Chinese society, is she implying that the best future will 
minimize privacy? Particularly since this interpretation of values runs 
counter to my American branch of ethnocentrism, can I really be sure I 
understand what she means? How do we deal, methodologically, with 
retrospective implications? 
Of course, many of the difficulties I encountered in my fieldwork were 
a function of doing cross-cultural research, particularly in China. The first 
difficulty is language. Since my Chinese is good primarily for buying 
vegetables, not conducting sophisticated discourse on social issues, the 
interviews were conducted in English. This had both advantages and 
disadvantages. Clearly, my main disadvantage was the inaccessibility of the 
vast number of Chinese scholars who spoke only Chinese, or perhaps 
French or Russian. In addition, the interviewees, whose English level was 
advanced, were still constrained by the inability to express themselves at 
their native intellectual level, but at the same time they were liberated by 
speaking in code--things can be said in English that would not be uttered in 
Chinese. A translator would be out of the question since that would 
eliminate any attempt at anonymity, which was vital to ensuring coopera­
tion. 
Unlike my American informants, Chinese scholars are unused to 
expressing personal opinions freely, especially to foreigners. Often the best 
observation would go unrecorded since the interviewee would not want to 
be linked with the observation. My rapport was sufficient to get fairly cre­
ative responses, but it was clear that many individuals, particularly the older 
scholars, were insecure, or even afraid to respond with any direct personal 
opinion. I had to respect their concern. In addition, politeness may dictate 
that nothing would be said that might disturb the American guest. This 
occasionally left me with the feeling of being invisibly second-guessed as 
the interviewees would carefully watch my responses to see if they were 
answering "correctly", that is, in a way that would not offend me. This 
concern was one reason I decided to get a large number of interviews (at 
least by qualitative, anthropological standards) to see a greater variety of 
opmton. 
The next perceptual screen I had to pierce was determining to what extent 
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the opinion was truly individual. Could I detect a "rhetoric factor", an 'I
Iinterpretation of social events in accordance with the current governmental policy? Surely the concordance of information and issues between interviews and the People's/China Daily was not entirely coincidence. 
Determining the larger social values is the whole point of the EFR 
technique, but in China social judgements may reflect a consciously 
articulated governmental policy. In any EFR interview, there is a key 
moment when the shape of the most probable future emerges. How is it 
like the optimistic scenario, or the pessimistic? In the 1988/1989 inter­
views, the response was overwhelming. All but one individual said the 
most probable future was only slightly less wonderful than the optimistic 
one (even though the details of the scenario might be contradictory to that 
assessment). Moreover, although the content of the best and most probable 
futures was more guardedly optimistic in the winter 1989/1990 interviews, 
it was also optimistic in the long view, after another decade or so of 
difficult times. Of course, within Marxism (as well as indigenous Chinese 
philosophies) there is the idea of an inherently brighter future. "Progress 
is inevitable", stated several intellectuals. There is a conscious effort in 
Chinese political rhetoric to emphasize this idea (whether the progress will 
reach fruition in 10 years or 200 is often subject to debate). Such overt 
optimism was inevitable. What was interesting was the degree to which 
individual answers belied the generalization. The theme was "Yes, the 
future will be better, but realistically, it won't be glorious quite so easily". 
This was particularly noticeable in the interviews after June 1989. The 
interplay between rhetoric and analytical foresight is a fruitful area of 
exploration. 
The events of June 1989 caught many foreign Sinologists by surprise 
(Coughlin, 1989). Yet the Chinese intellectual community Was slowly 
stirring before that time (see also Jacobson, 1989). The interviews came 
at a unique moment in recent Chinese history, at the edge of discontent-­
half of them at a time when freedom seemed greater than in anyone's 
memory; half at a time of greater caution. It was far easier to get personal 
opinions in 1989/1989 than in 1989/1990, for reasons of realpolitik and 







concerning the arrival of a bright future has been revised--it has been 
postponed potentially for several generations. The role of intellectuals has 
been defined more keenly--the scholars must realize they are workers in the 
service of the state. These factors have made the generation of an 
optimistic future, comparable to the developed world, more hesitant and  
decidedly more realistic. The future would still be brighter than today, so 
the scholars believed--but the timeframe would be longer and the path uphill  
steeper than anticipated. 
Beyond the purely methodological questions, the EFR technique readily 
yielded patterns that are worth discussing here. The concerns of over­
whelming interest to futurists--the fate of the developing world, the issue 
 
of planned and unplanned societies, the concerns of the group championing 
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EMERGENT THEMES--POWER, PLANNING AND SURVIVAL 
In the EFR interview, one gets a sense of not only the array of alterna­
tives in a given framework, but also the values--hopes and fears--of the 
interviewee, as well as a description of those current issues that will shape 
the future. When the rural Chinese construct a building, they lay earth 
bricks over a primary framework. One of the difficult jobs in analyzing the 
EFR interviews is separating the framework from the bricks. The 
following ideas, repeated over and over, may be part of that framework. 
One critical difference between my American and Chinese interviewees 
is the locus of control. Any American informants might cite economics, 
ideology, the supernatural, or luck as the agent of change, but always with 
a clear idea of the role of an individual as an actor. "In the future, we will 
be able to ... " is a common pattern. Not so in this Asian set of interviews. 
There is only one locus of control, the government, more specifically, the 
government's policies, not the laws, but the ever changing images of the 
near future. In futurist circles we often debate the merits of planned 
societies, forgetting that we have models of such societies in the world 
today. Repeatedly the informational distance and mercurial nature of 
central planning leaves a gnawing sense of frustration. Not only the 
workplace is assigned, but also the content of scientific work, based not on 
the scholar's education, interest or personal convenience, but on Beijing's 
outline of what is needed from science and technology in the immediate 
future. The plans are often either over-generalized, thus not including 
diversity or concrete goals, or over-specified, thus not allowing for regional 
variation or lack of infrastructure. This may give rise to some kind of 
failure, or the threat of failure, of the individual scientist, engineer or 
middle-level manager trying to implement the goal. In the interviews, 
virtually no one expressed the desire for complete freedom of choice, but 
instead a desire to "deregulate" and find greater freedom of choice within 
the larger policy guidelines of the central government. 
There was also a consciousness of the profound problems facing China 
as a developing country, particularly those issues emphasized by the 
government, such as population control, rural/urban divergence and possible 
emergence of a class distinction, and insufficient education. Such global 
considerations are an appropriate focus for futurists, since they represent 
the real world constraints on the shape of the future. Once again, pre­
existing rhetoric was a clear influence on the declaration of the problems 
by interviewees. Although personal experience was clearly a more 
profound factor than such rhetoric, such issues as the success of the one­
child policy (although never a critical analysis) or the increasingly obvious 
differences between the cities and the countryside were mentioned. On a 
more subtle level, there were long-standing rhetorical connections that 
caught me off-guard. For example, I was surprised, though perhaps I 
should not have been, that when I asked about science I frequently got 
responses about democracy. Why? Science and democracy were coupled 
in the educational development of early 20th century China as well as the 
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historic May 4th movement in 1919. They are coupled in rhetoric as well 
as in logic--things dealing with greater accessibility of information. 
Personal experience was overwhelmingly the source of information on 
change and trouble in Chinese society. All of the scholars interviewed had 
a university education, most were teachers as well as practicing engineers 
or researchers, some of whom had worked in primary and secondary educa­
tion in the countryside during and after the Cultural Revolution. At that 
time the status of intellectuals was low, just next to that of beggars. An 
effort was made to give them more prestige, and they are now officially 
workers, i.e. the good guys. 
Their concern with educational futures was intimate. The interviews 
revealed the conflicts inherent in a developing country, such as the budget 
and priority battle between mass education and elite development of science 
and technology. The lack of infrastructure and facilities (what use is a 
supercomputer if the electricity is not dependable?) was a consistent con­
cern. The poor material living conditions and the low morale of educators 
were the most common issues discussed in the interviews. Lack of broad 
support and empty coffers has led to a chronic undersupport of teachers. 
A young scholar working in the university makes 90--100 yuan monthly. 
To put that into perspective, a chicken costs 15 yuan, a bicycle 250-300 
yuan. Fixing shoes is far more lucrative. 
In the past decade of economic reforms, the perception has been that to 
be rich is glorious (even if this creed is officially revoked in the future, it 
is well established in the minds of the youth), and teachers are de facto 
inglorious. This has led to a crisis of morale. Coupled with the lack of 
facilities and genuine research opportunities--there is a sense that research 
now is mundane and filled with duplication (how many space heaters can 





optimistic scenario, but the majority of the interviewees felt policies would 
change in 30 years and more people would want to go and could go to 
universities. Although some scholars pointed out the crisis of money and 
morale in education in the countryside in their pessimistic scenarios, others 
pointed out that education remained a main avenue of social mobility, even 
if the economic payoff was low. An intellectual is an official, albeit 
usually not a high one, and the move to the urban sector may otherwise 
prove impossible for a member of a rural family in a society where 
residence is governmentally controlled. Many felt that education would 
proceed along two separate paths of vocational, practical training, especially 
in the countryside, and advanced theoretical work. 
In scientific education, often the greatest projected advance would be in 
those fields that do not need sophisticated technology, such as math and 
theoretical physics, or in those areas on the cutting edge--superconductors, 
computers, genetic engineering. Perhaps, scholars speculated, in those 
fields China would not be bogged down by existing lack of infrastructure 
and it could co-opt the latest nanotechnology. In spite of this optimism, it 
was also noted that neither theoretical research nor advanced research, 
which might require a large amount of foreign hard capital for equipment, 
was a high priority in educational policy. Not everyone lauded the coming 
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of an age of high technology. Some scholars dismissed higher level 
education, emphasizing that as long as the rate of rural illiteracy was 
astronomical, building the upper end would only accelerate the creation of 
two Chinas, a neolithic rural and a 21st century urban sector. 
FUTURE IMAGES AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
In my previous work with American informants I had been struck with 
the way in which visions of the future played a large part in fuelling social 
movement ideology. I had particularly noted the way in which holistic 
health practitioners revealed New Age expectations in the EFR interviews 
(English-Lueck, 1990). Although I had not anticipated tapping into social 
movement sentiment in my interviews with Chinese scholars, I might well 
have done so. China's modernization effort is not simply building more 
concrete structures and the occasional Weaver Girl rocket. Western ideas 
have accompanied the technology. Youth culture has revived elements of 
traditional Chinese arts and practices, as well as embracing jeans, rock 
music and a new cultural independence from the tyranny of an age-grade 
system in which the elders are unquestionably in the right. Although more 
conservative than the "waiting to work" set, intellectuals, particularly 
students, have adopted the values that inadvertently accompanied the 
opening of China in the last decade. The stage is set for a truly New 
China. How do these attitudes appear at the individual level, which is often 
invisible? 
It has been lamented by students of social movements (Gerlach and Hine, 
1981) that it is difficult to study a social movement in its early phases, 
before a crisis alters the worldview that highlights the visible features of the 
movement. For example, the 1968 Santa Barbara oil spill and Chemobyl 
disaster forever changed the perceptions and activities of the anti-nuclear 
and environmental movments. After all, most people do not study a social 
movement until after a crisis has crystallized that movement into a visible 
social entity. The EFR technique did reveal the stresses inherent in the 
system, before the events of June forever altered the visible efforts of 
Chinese intellectuals to effect change. After June 1989, in events better 
described by journalists than anthropologists, the outside image of the 
distress felt by the Chinese has been altered permanently in our perceptions. 
It is analytically very difficult now to separate the events of the "turmoil" 
in Beijing and other urban centers of China from the grassroots concerns 
of the relevant segment of Chinese society, the intellectuals. Understand­
able affective reactions and oversimplifications based on the highly visible 
turmoil of the 1989 May and June movement--i.e. the Western perception 
of a Chinese "yearning for democracy", or a causative factor of "outside 
agitators"--color, and perhaps obscure, any analysis. Although my 
interviewees did not march in the streets of Beijing, they had earlier 
expressed concern with the issues that the demonstrators highlighted-­
concern for corruption and emergent class distinctions and an increased 
desire for freedom of expression, within a planned centralized system. If 
social changes are lurking in the background of the collective consciousness 






of the Chinese intellectual, perhaps it would be useful to go back and 
reexamine their optimistic scenarios, the ones that I suspect contain the 
deepest motivation for change. The more widespread and opaquely visible 
message might be that Chinese intellectuals desire a materially prosperous 
future--although few would expect parity with the developed world--in a \centrally guided stable political environment where laws and not policies 

prevail and where each individual has increased ability to make moral and 

other life decisions. This vision is accompanied by an overall sense of na­

tionalism, i.e, a deep desire to retain and regain Chinese heritage. This 

was partially undermined during the attempted ethnosuicide of the Cultural \ 

Revolution and is now overshadowed by the ideology and economic influ­

ence of imported worldviews. 
 \ 
Planning, rhetoric, and personal experience shaped the images of China's 
future. Primarily an Americanist by training, I was deeply struck by the 
constraints--economic, structural and practical--on the Chinese intellectual. 
Doing futures research cross-culturally has presented some unique problems \but also yielded insights into my own preconceptions and biases. The 
future is not simply a projection of Middle-America with nifty gadgets--an 
image I feel sometimes pervades futurism--but reflects a complex set of 
widely divergent patterns, some of which are alien indeed. 
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